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In the ﬁrst year after the inception of the Swedish Green Car Rebate (GCR), green cars had
carved over 25 percent market share in the new vehicle market, an eﬀect of unprecedented scale
if compared to recent policies incentivizing the purchase of fuel-eﬃcient vehicles. By awarding
vehicles satisfying certain emission criteria a rebate, but giving alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs,
those able to run on alternative fuels) a more lenient treatment than regular fuel vehicles (RFVs,
those able to run only on gasoline and diesel), the GCR created a regulatory loophole which
led carmakers to increase the emissions of AFVs as compared to RFVs. This paper examines
the impact of regulation on market developments comparing CO2 emissions (and fuel economy)
of AFVs and RFVs. Once carmakers adjust their product lines to the policy, CO2 emissions of
AFVs increased signiﬁcantly as compared to those of RFVs, thus undermining the very objectives
of the GCR.
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1 Introduction
Economists have been interested in the interplay between regulation and market outcomes since at
least David Ricardo's analysis of the English Corn Laws in the early 1800s. Over one century later,
following the seminal contributions of Olson (1965), Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976), a substantial
body of literature studying the eﬀects of regulation developed, thanks to increased data availability
and advances in econometric methods.1
The transport sector has been the target of regulatory initiatives in a number of countries in
recent years, amid the ever growing concern with greenhouse gases (GHGs) and the quest for oil
independence.2 In addition to its importance to the GDP of many countries, the prominence of
the transport sector is justiﬁed because, ﬁrst, road transport is already responsible for about 20
percent of the CO2 emissions generated by fuel consumption worldwide (IEA 2011a) and, more
importantly, because transport fuel demand is set to grow by some 40 percent by 2035, and the
number of passenger cars worldwide is set to double to almost 1.7 billion in the same period, thanks
to the growth of emerging economies (IEA 2011b). Unfortunately, however, policies aimed at the
transport sector have typically not applied widely enough to aﬀect a large fraction of the new vehicle
market (Sallee 2011a), itself a small share of the car ﬂeet.
This is the ﬁrst paper to analyze a policy aimed at the automobile industry which had a broad
impact on the new car market, the Swedish Green Car Rebate (GCR); while similar policies managed
to aﬀect market shares in single digits, vehicles beneﬁting from the GCR (green cars) commanded
an unprecedented market share of 26.5 percent in 2008, the ﬁrst calendar year after its inception, as
compared to a pre-GCR market share of 6 percent in 2006.3
In addition to being broad, another crucial feature of the GCR is its embracing of alternative fuels,
arguably inspired by policies adopted in Brazil, where thanks to ethanol the CO2 emissions per unit of
fuel consumption in road transport are 20 percent below the global average (IEA 2011a). Promoting
alternative fuels comes hand-in-hand with the promotion of alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs)  those
able to operate using alternative fuels, such as Gasoline/CNG and Gasoline/Electric hybrids but,
most prominently, Gasoline/Ethanol vehicles, the so called ﬂexible-fuel vehicles (FFVs).
By combining the increased market shares of green cars and the lower carbon intensity of ethanol
as compared to fossil fuels, the GCR was arguably bound to be a success. However, what seems
to be the lack of understanding of the technologies being incentivized resulted in two important
drawbacks of the policy. First, the very deﬁnition of what a green car consists of induced carmakers
to produce high-emission AFVs instead of low-emission RFVs (regular fuel vehicles, those able to run
using only fossil fuels, eg. gasoline and diesel). That is, while RFVs were required to emit no more
than 120 gCO2/km (47 mpg running on gasoline) to qualify as green cars, the threshold for AFVs
was set to the equivalent of about 220 gCO2/km (25.5 mpg running on gasoline). 4 This regulatory
1For instance, Greenstone (2002) and Holmes (1998) examine the eﬀect of regulation on industrial activity and
industry location, respectively, whereas Berman and Bui (2001) and Kahn and Mansur (2010) study how productivity
and employment respond to new regulation.
2For instance, subsidies were awarded to hybrid and electric vehicles in the US and Canada, sales tax was reduced
in China and Brazil and stimulus/scrappage programs were launched in France, Germany, Italy Spain, the United
Kingdom and the US in 2008 and 2009. Given its design, the Swedish GCR, which was implemented before the global
crisis and was an environmental program, is closer in spirit to the US hybrid subsidy than the Cash for Clunkers
stimulus program.
3For perspective, Beresteanu and Li (2011) document that hybrid electric vehicles commanded a market share of
2.15 percent in the US in 2007 following a similar program.
4These ﬁgures are equivalent to, respectively, ratings 10 (the highest) and 7 according to the EPA Fuel Economy and
Environmental label introduced in 2011. The corresponding ﬁgures for diesel are 51.7 mpg and 28.2 mpg, respectively.
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loophole was duly explored by carmakers and consumers alike: following the GCR, CO2 emissions
of AFVs increased markedly as compared to those of RFVs in both supply and registration data
(see Figure 2). That is, carmakers reacted by increasing CO2 emissions (equivalently, reducing fuel
economy by increasing engine power and/or engine size) of AFV models available pre-GCR and/or
by introducing new variants of existing gasoline models, eg. a (higher emission) FFV version of a
captive gasoline vehicle.5 The reaction in the AFV camp was swift, with the action happening mostly
in the FFV segment; this is so because the FFV technology piggy-backs on the Otto cycle technology
used in gasoline vehicles. Moreover, given the lax treatment dispensed to AFVs, essentially every
FFV qualiﬁed as a green car; being available at roughly similar prices than their captive gasoline
counterparts, the FFV segment thus experienced the increase in market shares apparent in Figure 1.
Second, since the dominant AFVs are FFVs, which can seamlessly switch between gasoline and
ethanol, and a substantial share of consumers purchases the cheapest fuel, those high-emission FFVs
beneﬁting from the rebate were often fueled with gasoline, which emits more CO2 than ethanol. In
fact, fuel switching by FFV owners is apparent even from aggregate data, as witnessed by a dramatic
drop of over 70 percent in country-wide ethanol sales following the 2008 drop in international oil prices
(see Figure 3). That is, FFVs were also attractive to consumers for providing lower operating costs
than their captive gasoline counterparts and fuel choice becomes yet another dimension policymakers
should account for in policy design.
The empirical analysis of the paper closely follows the above narrative and proceeds in two steps.
First, I compare CO2 emissions and fuel economy of AFVs and RFVs using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
(DD) estimator for both supply (all products marketed within a year) and registration (all products
sold within a year) data. As suggested in Figure 2, CO2 emissions of AFVs and RFVs share a
common, downward, trend pre-GCR, a policy unanticipated by market participants. 6 Following the
GCR's inception, while CO2 emissions in the RFV segment continued their pre-policy trend, reﬂecting
the time it takes to develop a new powertrain (if at all, for a market as small as the Swedish one), the
trend of CO2 emissions in the AFV segment experienced a swift and stark reversal, trending upwards
instead, thanks to the loophole created by the asymmetry in the GCR emission thresholds. 7
Having established the importance of FFVs in the Swedish market, I propose a stylized structural
model of fuel choice by FFV owners, which I bring to data of the Swedish fuel market. To gauge the
eﬀect of fuel switching, I calibrate the model to data of the period around the sharp decline in oil
prices in connection with the 2008 global crisis, an arguably exogenous event.
The results unequivocally support the ﬁndings suggested by the descriptive analysis. Using supply
In what follows, I refer as low-emission (high-emission) vehicles to those emitting up to (more than) 120 gCO2/km.
Emissions of 120 gCO2/km amount to consumption of about 5 liters of gasoline or 4.5 liters of diesel per 100 km. While
being applied to individual cars rather than to a brand-level sales-weighted average as in the US CAFE standard, the
lower emission threshold is also more stringent than the 250 gCO2/mile (156.25 gCO2/km) CAFE standard to take
eﬀect from 2016 in the US.
5I document how the former eﬀect dominates the latter in Section 6.
6The idea of the GCR was made public and discussed by the Swedish Parliament in March 2007. The policy was
launched in April 2007, at which point all model-year 2007 vehicles had already been launched. In fact, since new
product lines are typically launched in the late fall, model-year 2007 vehicles were in the middle of their production
cycle. The policy seems to have caught carmakers by surprise and, even if they had anticipated some such policy,
it is unlikely that they had enough information to strategically adjust emission settings of their 2007 product lines
accordingly. Although carmakers cannot re-design their vehicles in the short-run, one cannot rule out responses in
other dimensions, e.g. marketing initiatives, but see Section 2 for why prices are unlikely to adjust, at least in the
short-run.
7I could not ﬁnd any evidence of conversions (retroﬁts) pursued by private individuals or garages. On top of
requiring some speciﬁc knowledge, skills and equipment, eg. adjustment of compression ratios, any vehicle warranties
would become null and void in case of such a conversion, making it unattractive, at least for relatively new vehicles.
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data (each marketed model receives an equal weight), the benchmark results point to a 21.5 gCO2/km
increase in emissions (or a 4.2 mpg decrease in fuel economy), which corresponds to 11 percent
of the emissions of the median 2006 vehicle, an eﬀect which is robust to the addition of controls
and alternative deﬁnitions of treatment and control groups. When decomposing this eﬀect into
separate ones for model-years 2008 and 2009, the paper documents how the responses of carmakers
strengthened over time following the inception of the GCR.
Using registration data, I obtain an insigniﬁcant eﬀect for calendar year 2007, when consumers
faced pre-GCR product lines, and a 24.6 gCO2/km increase in emissions (or a 6.1 mpg decrease in fuel
economy), which corresponds to 12.5 percent of the emissions of the median 2006 vehicle, again an
eﬀect which is robust to the addition of controls and alternative deﬁnitions of treatment and control
groups. These ﬁndings are in line with a vast literature looking at the automobile industry, eg. Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), Goldberg (1995), according to which consumers are willing to pay for
characteristics such as size (a proxy for comfort) and horsepower, which highly correlate with CO2
emissions and fuel economy.
The results from the fuel choice model suggest that a small share of FFV owners (11-18 percent)
fuels only with ethanol. In contrast, while a moderate fraction of FFV owners (6-43 percent) fuels
only with gasoline, the majority of FFV owners (46-77 percent) arbitrages across fuels, in spite of
pocketing the value of the rebate. That is, following a policy designed to reduce emissions and
promote oil independence via a monetary transfer to purchasers of green cars, a substantial share of
these very cars were high-emission vehicles running on the cheaper fossil fuel instead of the renewable
alternative. The eﬀects of fuel switching on air pollution are potentially dramatic in that life-cycle
CO2 emissions by FFVs increase by over 80 percent whereas emissions of pollutants such as NOx and
particulate matter (PM) increase by about 21 and 46 percent, respectively. 8
In sum, the above ﬁndings are consistent with the view that the GCR was not much more than
a transfer to consumers purchasing FFVs. More generally, the ﬁndings highlight the margins pol-
icymakers should take into account when designing environmental policies aimed at the transport
sector. Importantly, such ﬁndings are not restricted to ethanol, but should hold to any alternative to
the established fossil fuels.
At the root of the problem lies the lax treatment enjoyed by AFVs, in particular the dominant
gasoline-ethanol FFV, likely due to the lack of understanding of the technology. In addition to
the similarity to the standard Otto cycle technology (of which it is a derivative), reasons why FFVs
commanded the lion's share among AFVs include the fuel-switching enabled by the technology, and the
well-developed retail network for ethanol as opposed to say, CNG, whose retail network is concentrated
in the Southwest of the country. As a result, FFV owners are able to arbitrage across fuels and reduce
the operating costs of their driving.
The paper relates to diﬀerent branches of the literature. The closest paper to this one is Anderson
and Sallee (2011), which shows how carmakers explore a regulatory loophole arising from the CAFE
standard. Another closely related paper is Knittel (2011), which performs a long-run analysis of the
US automobile industry and points to consumer preferences as being the drivers of changes in vehicle
characteristics. Here, in addition to documenting how the GCR created a loophole, I show how the
reactions of both ﬁrms and consumers jointly work against the very objectives of the policy, unveiling
the role of technology and identifying the mechanism by which consumers and carmakers react to the
GCR.
The paper also contributes to the burgeoning literature on policies directed towards the transport
8Local air pollutants such as nitrogen oxides (NOx) and particulate matter (PM) are not GHGs, but are known to
harm human health, thus being classiﬁed as criteria pollutants by the US EPA.
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sector, notably the automobile industry, see for instance Beresteanu and Li (2011), Chandra, Gulati
and Kandlikar (2010), Huse and Lucinda (2013), Li, Linn and Spiller (2011), and Miravete and Moral
(2009).
By focusing on fuel choice decisions made by FFV owners, the paper relates to the literature on
the interaction between fuel and car markets, as in Borenstein (1993), Busse, Knittel and Zettelmeyer
(2009), Li, Timmins and von Haefen (2009) and Klier and Linn (2010). In contrast to the bulk of
the established literature, I document how fuel switching among FFV owners occurs rapidly due to
the particular technology in place. Moreover, by calibrating a structural model of fuel choice for an
entire market, the paper contributes to research on the choice between fossil and renewable fuels as
in Anderson (2012) and Salvo and Huse (2013).
Finally, by focusing on the eﬀects of fuel switching on air pollution, and by providing estimates
of the shares of diﬀerent consumer types when it comes to fuel choice, the paper relates to research
on air quality in economics, see Chay and Greenstone (2003), Davis (2008), Auﬀhammer and Kellogg
(2011), and complements research in the natural sciences on the eﬀects of ethanol on air quality, see
Jacobson (2007).
2 Background
Despite its small size in absolute terms, the Swedish passenger car market in the mid-2000s is com-
parable to larger European ones such as the French and German when looking at ownership on a per
capita basis. In contrast to the variety of brands on the market, the commonplace view of the average
family car being a Volvo wagon is not too far from reality in the country, as are the slightly older ﬂeet
and the larger (and likely less fuel-eﬃcient) vehicles circulating, as reported in Table 1. For instance,
back in 2008 the average Swedish car was 9.5 years old and 39.1 percent of the ﬂeet was aged above 10
years, numbers signiﬁcantly worse than those for France and Germany. More generally, while within
the European Union (EU) passenger cars are responsible for about 12 percent of the overall emissions,
within Sweden this share is a much higher 19 percent (Commission of the European Communities
2007). In fact, Sweden lags signiﬁcantly behind most EU 25 countries, with estimated CO2 emissions
only lower than those of (poorer countries) Estonia and Latvia (EFTE 2009). Reducing emissions
from passenger cars is thus essential for Sweden to meet EU-wide environmental goals.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Green Car Rebate Sweden has been an early backer of renewable technologies in the transport
sector, with the adoption of ethanol-fueled buses in its larger cities, and by generating governmental
demand for ethanol cars since the 1990s, when the Ford Focus was ﬁrst marketed in the country
(Volvo and Saab introduced their FFV models only in 2005). Moreover, Sweden has been importing
ethanol since the early 2000s and boasts a well-established distribution network whereby over 50
percent of fueling stations supply at least one alternative fuel since 2009, typically ethanol.
With the aim of reducing both GHG emissions and oil dependence, in April 2007 the Swedish
government introduced a rebate scheme to promote environmentally friendly vehicles. Following the
fall 2006 elections, a new government was formed which came to power later that year and proposed
the GCR. The program, which was passed in Parliament and announced to the public in March 2007,
eﬀectively starting in April 2007, consisted of a rebate of 10,000 SEK (Swedish krona) to private
individuals upon the purchase of a new green car. As the SEK/$ exchange rate was 6.984 and 7.650
at the inception and at the end of the program, respectively, this amounts to $1,300-1,500, or about
5
6 percent oﬀ the price of a new 2009 VW Golf 1.6 FFV. The GCR was initially scheduled to operate
between April 2007 and December 2009. However, in fall 2008 it was made public that the program
would end early on June 30 2009 (Ministry of the Environment 2008a). Thus, although its end was
anticipated, it is unlikely that product lines for 2009 were designed having in mind that the GCR
was to end in June 2009.
Crucially, the policy caught carmakers by surprise: carmakers typically launch product lines once
a year, which requires them to plan their overall strategy well in advance. In the Swedish market,
where this happens late in the fall, the product lines for model-year 2007 had been launched in late
2006 and were already in the middle of their production cycle. As a result, although carmakers could
respond to the GCR via, say, advertising, they were only able to re-engineer their products, e.g.
change product lines, alter vehicle design, for model-year 2008, an institutional feature to be used in
the empirical strategy below.9
Green Car Deﬁnition For the purposes of the GCR, the deﬁnition of a green car depends on
compliance with certain emission criteria and on the type of fuel(s) the car is able to run on (SFS
2007). Cars running on regular fuels (fossil fuels such as gasoline and diesel) RFVs qualify as
green cars provided they emit no more than 120 gCO2/km, whereas AFVs, ie. cars able to run
on alternative fuels such as ethanol, gas and electricity do qualify provided they consume up to the
gasoline-equivalent of 9.2 liter/100km, the gas-equivalent of 9.7m3/100km or less than 37 kWh/100km,
respectively.
Although the thresholds deﬁning RFVs and AFVs are expressed in diﬀerent units (gCO2/km
and liter/100km) the CO2 emissions and fuel eﬃciency measures are highly negatively correlated:
for vehicles marketed in Sweden, the correlation between CO2 emissions (in gCO2/km, the measure
typically used within the EU) and mpg (miles per gallon, the measure typically used in the US) is
-0.92, with the threshold for AFVs being equivalent to approximately 220 gCO2/km (for perspective,
the 2012 Porsche 911 Carrera emits 205 gCO2/km).10 All in all, the threshold deﬁning alternative
green cars is substantially more lenient than the one deﬁning regular ones. Anecdotal evidence suggest
that this was a way the newly-formed government managed to get the support of the Green Party.
Fuels The dominant fuel among alternative ones is ethanol, with gas (which encompasses com-
pressed natural gas or CNG, liqueﬁed natural gas or LNG, and liqueﬁed petroleum gas or LPG; in
what follows I refer to gasoline-gas hybrids as gasoline/CNG vehicles) and electric alternatives also
available but commanding slim market shares. Ethanol (also known as E85, a 85-15 blend of ethanol
and gasoline, where the latter works as a lubricant and helps starting the engine), a fuel made from
renewable raw materials such as sugar cane or cereals (notably corn), is the dominant renewable fuel
in Sweden. The environmental beneﬁts of ethanol depend on how it is produced, with sugarcane
bringing the highest environmental gains. Ethanol life-cycle CO2 emissions, i.e. those considering
also the emissions generated during its production and distribution, are approximately 55 percent
lower than those of gasoline (Swedish Consumer Agency 2011). Ethanol does however emit other
pollutants (see Section 6).
Typically, AFVs are also able to operate using a regular fuel  usually gasoline  and either ethanol,
gas or electricity (thus often being referred to as hybrids). Given their ability to seamlessly drive
9Interestingly, and in contrast with stylized facts for other markets, there does not seem to be evidence of bunching
at the 120 gCO2/km threshold, likely due to the size of the Swedish market. In fact, the ﬁgures for low-emission
gasoline and diesel vehicles do not seem to change by much from 2006 (or earlier, in the case of gasoline) to 2009.
10In other words, regulation of fuel economy and emissions is almost equivalent, see Anderson, Parry, Sallee and
Fischer (2011).
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with any combination of ethanol and gasoline which are stored in the same tank, gasoline-ethanol
cars are called FFVs (ﬂexible-fuel vehicles).11 The price of a FFV is slightly higher than that of a
comparable gasoline model, but used FFVs trade at similar prices than comparable captive gasoline
models. Importantly, Sweden being a small market, car dealers keep very low inventory levels, so
much so that typically one has to order a car a few months in advance and make a deposit, which
results in very few episodes of sales or rebates from the part of carmakers and/or dealers and stable
prices within a model-year (see Huse and Koptyug 2013 for details).12
While the seamless switch between fuels avoids lock-in problems resulting from incipient retail
networks of a newly-established renewable fuel, it also allows owners of FFVs to arbitrage across fuels:
ethanol has a lower energy content than gasoline, thus resulting in a higher ethanol consumption per
distance traveled, with an implied price parity (no-arbitrage relation) of pe ' 0.7pg. As a result,
despite receiving a rebate upon the purchase of a FFV, nothing prevents the owner of a FFV from
driving his automobile as if it was a captive gasoline car.
From the carmaker's perspective, introducing a FFV version of an existing model is a cheap and
straightforward task. All that is required is a sensor which detects the mix between ethanol and
gasoline from the exhaust pipe fumes and sends a message to the vehicle's electronic central unit
(ECU), which then adjusts the engine settings accordingly. Cost estimates of the operation are in
the range $100-200, roughly 10 percent of the value of the rebate. (See Anderson and Sallee 2011 and
Salvo and Huse 2012 for details).
3 Data
I combine a number of datasets, from administrative-based registration data to publicly-available car
characteristics, fuel data and air pollutants. The details are as follows.
Car Characteristics Product characteristics are obtained from the consumer guides Nybilsguiden
(New Car Guide) issued yearly by Konsumentverket, the Swedish Consumer Agency. For every car
model available on the Swedish market the information available includes characteristics such as
fuel type, engine power and displacement, number of cylinders, number of doors, gearbox type, fuel
economy (city driving, highway driving and mixed driving, with testing made under EU-determined
driving cycle and expressed in liters per 100 kilometers, or 100 cubic meters per km for CNG cars),
CO2 emissions (measured in gCO2/km under EU-determined driving conditions and mixed driving),
vehicle tax and list prices.
Car Registrations Car registration data is from Vroom, a consulting ﬁrm. The data on privately
owned vehicles is recorded at the monthly frequency from January 2005 to December 2009. An
observation is a combination of year, brand, model, engine size, fuel type, and a green car indicator.
Fuel Data I use market level data for fuels recorded at the monthly frequency at the national
level. Recommended retail fuel prices for gasoline, diesel and ethanol are obtained from the biggest
11FFVs have a long tradition in the auto industry; for instance, Henry Ford thought that biofuels were the fuel of
the future and believed ethanol would become the most commonly used fuel source. In fact, Ford's vision of mass
biofuel consumption began with his Model T, which was a FFV from the original design (National Geographic 2007).
However, the decreasing cost of oil extraction and the US prohibition meant that most Model Ts were run on oil-derived
petrol (The Telegraph 2008). Nowadays, FFVs command a substantial share of the car ﬂeet in Brazil and the US.
12In particular, I could not ﬁnd any evidence that either carmakers or car dealers were taking advantage of the policy
by raising vehicle prices, be it anecdotally or conducting news searches.
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distributors in Sweden, OKQ8 and Statoil. Gasoline companies do not provide actual prices which
vary by region and even by station. Also at the national level I use quantities sold for gasoline,
ethanol and diesel obtained from the Swedish Petroleum Institute (SPI). Given the recent introduction
of alternative fuels, ethanol and CNG prices are available from January 2005 and January 2007,
respectively.
Air Pollutants I use emissions data from a number of sources. First, exhaust CO2 emissions are
obtained from the Swedish Consumer Agency. I use life-cycle carbon emission data from the Swedish
Transport Authority. Finally, I also use data comparing exhaust pollutants emitted by gasoline-
and ethanol-fueled vehicles from the US EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) and Yanowitz and
McCormick (2009).
Combining Datasets I merge characteristics and registration datasets to estimate the eﬀect of
the GCR on CO2 emissions of newly-registered vehicles. One important issue arising when combining
registration and characteristic datasets is that the former is observed at a more aggregate level than
the latter. Despite being more aggregated than the car characteristics, this level of aggregation
still allows identifying quite accurately the version of a model that was purchased and, critically, to
match this information with product characteristics, especially CO2 emissions and fuel economy. 13
Reassuringly, since the original source of the data is administrative and vehicle taxes are based on
both fuel and engine and/or CO2 emission information, any aggregation biases should be minimal.
This is especially so for green cars: given the relatively small number of green versions (typically one
or two per model), aggregation issues for these models essentially vanish.
4 Descriptive Analysis
In this Section, I ﬁrst document the development of market shares of diﬀerent fuel segments in the
Swedish car market in the period around the GCR. Then, I examine the evolution of CO2 emissions
of AFVs and RFVs using both supply and registration data.
When looking at market shares, the striking ﬁnding is that FFVs gained market share at the
expense of regular, high-emission, vehicles. The pattern of sales-weighted market shares is reported
in Figure 1, which shows how high-emission RFVs lost market share to low-emission RFVs and,
most importantly FFVs, following the GCR. In fact, while the market share of high-emission RFVs
dropped from 92.1 percent in December 2006 to 84.6 and 72.4 percent in December 2007 and 2008,
respectively, FFVs increased their market share from 6.4 percent in December 2006 to 9.9 and 19.8
percent in December 2007 and 2008, respectively. Low-emission RFVs increased their market share
in a less pronounced way, from 1 percent in December 2006 to 4.8 percent in December 2007 and 6.2
percent in December 2008, while CNG and electric hybrid vehicles never commanded more than 1
percent of the market during the sample period.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
The rise of FFVs can be attributed to the similarity between the FFV and the standard gasoline
technologies (namely the Otto four stroke engine) as well as the well-established ethanol retail network
in the country. In the eyes of the average consumer, conditional on purchasing a model available in
both FFV and gasoline variants, the choice was between a captive gasoline version and its FFV
13I have also manually checked fuel economy and CO2 emissions of diﬀerent versions of the same model sharing the
same fuel, engine and green car indicator in Nybilsguiden.
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version, which was slightly more expensive but sold at a rebate due to the GCR, and which allowed
its owner to arbitrage across fuels, thus enabling lower operating costs. 14
A crucial ﬁnding worth mentioning is the development of average CO2 emissions of AFVs and
RFVs during the sample period, which will guide the empirical analysis below. Both supply- and
registration-based ﬁgures are reported in Figure 2, see Panels A and B, respectively; in the former,
all marketed vehicles are given uniform weights when computing the average CO2 emissions whereas
in the latter, those weights are given by their market shares. In either graph, emission levels of AFVs
and RFVs share a common, downward, trend prior to the GCR, with emission levels of RFVs being
somewhat higher than those of AFVs.
However, starting from model-year 2008, the average CO2 emissions of AFVs experience a dra-
matic change, resulting in an upward trend in emission levels in both supply and registration data.
There are two ways such a change can materialize.15 First, carmakers could have tinkered with prod-
ucts existing prior to the GCR by increasing emission levels of AFVs and/or decreasing emission
levels of RFVs, in order to make them eligible for the rebate. In practice, this can be achieved via
changes in the chips governing the electronic central unit (ECU) of most vehicles or by changing the
powertrain with which a given variant is equipped.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Second, carmakers could introduce new products such as a (previously non-existent) FFV variant
of an existing model. Given the incentive structure of the GCR, it is rather plausible that new products
were more likely to emit less than 120 gCO2/km conditional on being RFVs, but not necessarily so in
the case of AFVs due to the asymmetry in the deﬁnition of what a green car consists of. As I discuss
below, the eﬀects of the GCR on emissions and fuel economy can be thought of as a composition of
the tinkering eﬀect described above with the eﬀect of product introduction following the policy.
The ﬁndings documented in Figure 2 suggest that both carmakers and consumers acted in ways
that resulted in increases in average CO2 emissions of new vehicles. Alternatively, one could argue
that both groups took advantage of the loophole provided by the GCR, thus working against its very
objectives. That is, faced with vehicles similar to existing captive gasoline ones, sold at a rebate
and allowing lower operating costs, a non-trivial share of consumers voted with their feet against
high-emission RFVs ﬂocking towards their alternative  mostly FFV  counterparts.
5 Econometric Analysis
5.1 Empirical Strategy
Setup I focus on the eﬀect of the GCR on CO2 emission levels and fuel economy of newly-purchased
AFVs as compared to RFVs. To do so, I estimate speciﬁcations of the form
yit = δ1{t ∈ Γ}1{i ∈ ℵ}+ τ1{t ∈ Γ}+ γ1{i ∈ ℵ}+ x′itβ + uit (1)
14Although diesel cars have also gained market share in the Swedish market, the evidence of dieselization is not as
pronounced as in other European countries (see Miravete and Moral 2009).
15I have also examined a third alternative, according to which carmakers have pursued price adjustments of vehicles
beneﬁting from the GCR. While within a year vehicle prices are ﬁxed, since a new car is typically ordered from the
car dealer and taking between four weeks and four months to be delivered (see Huse and Lucinda 2013), price changes
across years are minimal. I thus argue that the change in sales-weighted CO2 emissions are driven by (a subset of)
characteristics typically treated as exogenous in the demand literature.
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where t = 1, ..., T are time periods, i = 1, ..., N are products, yit is the variable of interest (CO2
emissions, measured in gCO2/km or fuel economy, measured in miles per gallon, mpg), Γ denotes
the period during which the GCR was in place, ℵ denotes the set of treated subjects, namely AFVs,
the indicator 1{A} takes on value one if the event A holds, and xit is a set of controls.16 Given the
unexpected character of the policy, I make use of diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) techniques focusing
on estimates of δ. I estimate the eﬀects separately for supply and registration data.
Supply-side Data In the supply-side analysis, I assign uniform weights to all car models marketed
in a given year, so i indexes car models available on the market, t is measured in years and the indicator
1{t ∈ Γ} takes on value one starting from year 2008, the ﬁrst where carmakers were able to react
to the GCR by re-engineering their products. The supply-side analysis thus assesses to which extent
carmakers adjusted their product lines following the introduction of the GCR. Since carmakers have
more time to re-engineer their vehicles in 2009 as compared to 2008, I also estimate speciﬁcations
where I decompose post-GCR responses into one eﬀect for each of these two years.
Registration Data When using registration data, i indexes a tuple of brand-model-fuel-emissions
for each newly-registered vehicle and t is measured in months. With such a data structure, I am able
to account for both how consumers react to the GCR and to potential adjustments in the choice set
(product lines) following the policy. That is, more than comparing CO2 emission levels or mpg of
AFVs vs. RFVs before and after the policy, I take advantage of the institutional setting to distinguish
between short-run and long-run eﬀects of the program. Speciﬁcally, I am able to disentangle these
eﬀects since consumers respond to the GCR already in 2007 (between April and December 2007) when
they face the choice set deﬁned by the 2007 product line; in contrast, carmakers are unable to react to
the policy by re-engineering their vehicles still in 2007, meaning that the choice set facing consumers
in the short-run is ﬁxed (see Section 2 for discussion). Since it is only with the introduction of the
2008 product line that carmakers are able to eﬀectively react to the policy, I replace the indicator
1{t ∈ Γ} in the baseline speciﬁcation above with an indicator 1{t ∈ ΓSR} which takes on value
one between April and December 2007 to measure the short-run eﬀects of the policy and another
1{t ∈ ΓLR} which takes on value one from January 2008 to June 2009 to gauge the long-run eﬀects
of the GCR. As carmakers may well respond diﬀerently in model-years 2008 (for which they had only
months to prepare) and 2009, in some speciﬁcations I further decompose the long-run eﬀects into
elements 1{t ∈ ΓLR1} and 1{t ∈ ΓLR2} taking on value one during calendar year 2008 and the period
January-June 2009, respectively.
Standard Errors Standard errors are clustered at the carmaker (brand) level, for if carmakers
aim at adjusting their products according to emissions (equivalently, fuel economy), or if they vary in
terms of characteristics that may aﬀect those variables, their errors will be correlated. 17 Clustering at
the carmaker level will account for the variation in the correlation across models and within carmaker
(see Knittel 2011 for a similar strategy).
16Both CO2 emissions and fuel economy (typically in liters/100km) are obtained under ideal conditions, eg. constant
speed, and routinely reported by carmakers (via, eg. the Nybilsguiden). Note that CO2 emissions are inversely related
to mpg, with a correlation of -0.92 in the data. In turn, the relation between CO2 emissions and gpm  gallons per
mile  is linear, with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.98.
17Intuitively, this amounts to assuming some within-brand correlation among models, consistent with an industry
where brands seem to have developed expertise in what concerns market segments, e.g. French carmakers tend to
specialize in smaller vehicles whereas German ones tend to target the higher end of the market. In fact, conglomerates
such as Volkswagen, Toyota and Honda, have developed portfolios of brands to cater diﬀerent market segments.
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5.2 Identiﬁcation
Identiﬁcation of the DD estimator relies on a combination of statistical and institutional arguments,
see Figure 2. As a pre-condition for the DD analysis, I test for the existence of pre-GCR common
trends in the CO2 emissions of RFVs and AFVs: this is performed for both supply and registration
data by estimating a triple diﬀerence speciﬁcation where the eﬀect of interest is measured by the
coeﬃcient associated to the interaction of a time trend, a pre-GCR indicator and a treatment group
indicator. Since one cannot reject the null hypothesis of a common trend between CO2 emissions
of RFVs and AFVs pre-GCR at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level using neither supply nor registration
data, this lends support to the use of the DD estimator throughout the analysis.
Next, recall that the GCR was not only unanticipated but had a very fast implementation (one
month), see Section 2 for details. Moreover, its announcement and implementation were already
in the middle of the 2007 model-year production cycle (March-April 2007), since product lines had
already been launched in late 2006.
Turning to post-GCR trends, CO2 emissions of RFVs tend to behave in a similar manner as
compared to the pre-policy period for the rest of the sample period. This is suggestive of a slug-
gish response to the GCR in the RFV segment, which can be rationalized by the fact that design-
ing/bringing to market a new powertrain takes time, ie. although carmakers are able to marginally
change powertrain conﬁgurations swiftly via changes in chips governing a vehicle's ECU, a more thor-
ough adjustment consisting of a low-emission engine would be costlier and take time. What is more,
Sweden being a small market, the development of a tailor-made powertrain in order for a vehicle
to qualify as a green car is unlikely to be a proﬁtable enterprise. For AFVs, however, the trend in
CO2 emissions changes dramatically, suggesting not only a quick response in this segment, but also
an increase in CO2 emissions of AFVs as a reaction to the policy. This can be rationalized by the
fact that turning a captive gasoline vehicle into an FFV  the leading AFV, see Figure 1 and results
below  consists of installing a $100-200 (and falling) FFV kit
The increase in CO2 emissions among AFVs (think of FFVs to ﬁx ideas) can occur in either
the intensive or the extensive margin, ie. via adjustments in characteristics of existing model-fuel
combinations (increasing engine size and/or engine power of an existing AFV, say) or, more likely
among brands which already operate in the AFV segment, via the introduction of new model-fuel
combinations (a previously non-existent FFV variant of an existing model, say), the latter of which
poses a threat to the exogeneity of the AFV indicator in equation (1).
In what follows I devise two strategies to address such concern. First, given the possibility that a
set of observable variables that determine the AFV indicator may be correlated with the outcomes,
I follow a control function (CF) approach, ie. I introduce a set of control variables in an attempt to
approximate the inﬂuence of omitted variables in equation (1). These variables are obtained from
a set of ﬁrst-stage probit regressions whereby the AFV indicator (the FFV indicator was also used
for robustness) is regressed on a set of variables, including an indicator of whether a carmaker's
conglomerate (group) owned an AFV technology the previous year interacted with variables such as
lagged sales, an indicator of whether a given model had CO2 emissions in excess of 120 gCO2/km
and a GCR dummy, which I label as the AFV determinants.18
18Note that being lagged, these variables are pre-determined with respect do the dependent variables and covariates
in equation (1). Using group instead of brand comes from the fact that brands within a group often pool resources, eg.
brands VW and Audi within the VW Group share powertrains for the VW Golf and the Audi A4; the ﬁndings reported
are robust to the use of brand instead of group though. I have also experimented with other variables interacted with
ownership of the AFV technologies, but (lagged) sales and CO2 emissions were the ones with some  albeit small 
predictive power in probit models (or linear probability models) where the dependent variable was either the AFV
or the FFV indicator. While the CO2 emissions indicator directly relates to the GCR emissions threshold, sales are
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Second, I also estimate speciﬁcations considering only the subset of model-fuel combinations
available pre-GCR and thus unable to self-select into treatment by construction (see Column 4 of
each panel in Table 3 and labeled as pre-GCR). That is, one can argue that the DD estimates using
only pre-GCR models provide a lower-bound to the eﬀect of the GCR on CO2 emissions (or mpg) by
considering product line adjustments in the intensive rather than the extensive margin. As I detail
below, although the resulting eﬀects are (not surprisingly) milder when compared to those obtained
using the full sample, the pre-GCR eﬀects are still signiﬁcant and within the 95 percent conﬁdence
bounds of the full sample estimates, thus suggesting that endogeneity is of limited concern (see also
the discussion of the results below).
6 Eﬀect of the GCR on CO2 Emissions and Fuel Economy
This section reports on the eﬀects of the GCR on CO2 emissions and fuel economy of AFVs and
RFVs looking separately at supply-side and registration eﬀects.19 While in the supply-side analysis
all marketed products are equally weighted, when looking at registration data products are sales-
weighted, giving it an equilibrium interpretation. For every speciﬁcation, I report the main results in
terms of CO2 emissions measured in gCO2/km and (for the sake of comparability with a substantial
part of the literature) in terms of fuel economy expressed mpg  the latter are reported within square
brackets in Tables 2 and 3. All speciﬁcations use data from years 2005-2009.
While the paper mostly focuses on the relative CO2 emission levels (mpg) of AFVs and RFVs, I
also contemplate alternative deﬁnitions of treatment and control groups. For instance, I also consider
speciﬁcations where treatment and control groups are, respectively, FFVs (thus a subset of AFVs)
and the set of captive gasoline vehicles (upon which the FFV technology piggy-backs). Moreover,
since no FFV emits less than 120 gCO2/km in my data, I have also, eg. compared FFVs to the subset
of high-emission gasoline vehicles, see the Appendix for robustness checks.
As a pre-requisite for the subsequent analysis, I test for the existence of a common trend between
CO2 emissions of AFVs and RFVs prior to the GCR, very much in the spirit of Figure 2. To do
so, I estimate a triple diﬀerence speciﬁcation; the eﬀect of interest is measured by the coeﬃcient
associated to the interaction of a time trend, a pre-GCR indicator and a treatment group indicator.
Since one cannot reject the null hypothesis of a common trend between CO2 emissions of RFVs and
AFVs pre-GCR, this lends support to the use of the DD estimator.
6.1 Supply-side Eﬀects
To estimate the supply-side eﬀects of the GCR on CO2 emissions and mpg, I focus on DD coeﬃcients
interacting the AFV indicator with an indicator for the period in which the GCR is in place, see
Table 2.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
The robust ﬁnding across speciﬁcations is that, following the GCR, CO2 emissions of AFVs
increased as compared to those of RFVs. Without any covariates, Speciﬁcation 1 in Panel A of Table
typically inversely related to markup, thus proportional to elasticities (in absolute value), and can be thought of as
a reduced-form way  however imperfect  of capturing which models would be more impacted by having an FFV
version.
19When using CO2 emissions as the dependent variable, one may be tempted to use dollar per mile-like quantities
as covariates; recall, however, that emissions and fuel economy are simultaneously determined.
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2 returns DD estimates of 21.48 gCO2/km, or -4.16 mpg, both signiﬁcant at the one percent level
and 11 percent of the emissions of the median 2006 vehicle. Since operating costs are key when
considering both the purchase of a vehicle and the development of product lines, I introduce fuel-year
ﬁxed-eﬀects to capture fuel price trends over time. Moreover, since carmakers are more likely to
introduce AFVs if they had AFVs on oﬀer previously and, if so, are likely to do so strategically, I
also introduce AFV determinants, ie. interactions between an indicator of whether a group owned
an AFV technology the previous year interacted with either (i) lagged sales or (ii) an indicator of
whether a given model had CO2 emissions in excess of 120 gCO2/km. Finally, I also interact AFV
determinants with a GCR dummy.
Controlling for fuel prices and AFV determinants yields a DD estimate of 28.47 gCO2/km or -13.89
mpg  see Speciﬁcation 2 , both signiﬁcant at the one percent level. Further introducing interactions
between AFV determinants and a GCR dummy hardly changes the results, see Speciﬁcation 3. 20
Since most of the action in the AFV segment comes from FFVs, one could argue that the right
treatment and control groups to be considered are, respectively, FFVs and captive gasoline vehicles,
which share the same technology; as FFVs essentially piggy-back on the gasoline technology, the
choice of a carmaker to launch a FFV version of a given vehicle ultimately amounts to the decision
of spending an extra $100-200 in a sensor to detect the gasoline-ethanol mix in the engine; this
information is then passed on to the vehicle's electronic central unit which adjusts engine settings
according to the fuel mix.21 Thus, Speciﬁcations 4-5 focus on two sub-samples of the data: while the
former considers only Gasoline and FFV vehicles, the latter considers only Gasoline and Electric and
CNG hybrids. While Speciﬁcation 5 returns estimates which are not only small but also insigniﬁcant,
those of Speciﬁcation 4 are very close to those of Speciﬁcation 1: at 16.23 gCO2/km or -2.57 mpg,
both of which are signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level, they imply that 75 percent (=16.23/21.48) of
the AFV-RFV increase in CO2 emissions in the supply-side comes from FFVs as compared to captive
gasoline models. That is, the combined role played by diesel, CNG and electric vehicles amounts to
just 25 percent of changes in CO2 emissions.
Once post-GCR eﬀects are decomposed into separate ones for years 2008 and 2009, the robust
ﬁnding is that these responses strengthen over time, see Panel B (each column in Panel B is to be
compared to the corresponding one in Panel A); this can be attributed to the extra time carmakers
had to react when planning their model-year 2009 product lines. In particular, while there is mixed
evidence that the eﬀects for model-year 2008 are signiﬁcant, those for model-year 2009 are signiﬁcant
and very close to each other, regardless of the controls used. What is more, the sub-sample results
obtained in Panel A, according to which the post-GCR developments mostly happen in the FFV
segment, follow through in this case.
All in all, the above ﬁndings support the view that lax constraints placed on AFVs were duly
exploited by carmakers. What is more, when decomposing post-GCR eﬀects into separate ones for
model-years 2008 and 2009, point estimates consistently point to a strengthening eﬀect over time
from the part of carmakers. Finally the results also show that the reactions to the GCR seem to have
concentrated in the FFV segment.
20Note also that introducing these controls considerably improves the explanatory power of the speciﬁcations, as
measured in terms of the CO2 emission regressions R-squared, from one to over 14 percent, and even more so for mpg
regressions.
21In addition, to protect against corrosion, the conversion requires an extra coating of all parts in contact with the
fuel, since ethanol contains water. There are also some ﬁxed, conversion, costs to be considered, as carmakers need to




Sales-weighted DD regressions allow disentangling diﬀerent eﬀects of the GCR taking advantage of
the institutional setting. That is, given the interpretation of equilibrium outcomes one can give to
registration data, with knowledge of the market developments one is able to infer something about
supply- and demand-induced changes in market outcomes. Doing so, I focus on two eﬀects. First, I
examine how consumers react to both pre- and post-policy product lines (choice sets), denoted ΓSR
and ΓLR. Second, I decompose long-run eﬀects of the policy into separate ones for product lines
2008 and 2009, denoted by ΓLR1 and ΓLR2, respectively.
All speciﬁcations in Panel A of Table 3 report a short-run eﬀect (captured by the interaction
of the AFV indicator with an indicator for the period April-December/2007) and a long-run eﬀect
(captured by the interaction of the AFV indicator with an indicator for the period January 2008 until
June 2009). Speciﬁcation 1, which does not have any controls, has an insigniﬁcant estimate for year
2007 and a signiﬁcant one of 24.60 gCO2/km (-6.08 mpg) for 2008 onwards, which amounts to 12.5
percent of the emission levels of the median 2006 vehicle.
As both consumers and carmakers are likely to consider operating costs when purchasing and
designing an automobile, respectively, Speciﬁcations 2-3 do control for fuel prices via fuel-time ﬁxed-
eﬀects. Qualitatively, the short- and long-run aﬀects are similar to those for Speciﬁcation 1, even
though the long-run estimates become milder as more controls are introduced, eg. emissions increase
by 19.22 gCO2/km and fuel economy decreases by -3.77 mpg for Speciﬁcation 3. The signiﬁcant
increases in emissions (decreases in fuel economy) from model-year 2008 suggests that once product
lines were adjusted, consumers went for less fuel-eﬃcient vehicles.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
The above ﬁndings beg the question of where these product line adjustments are coming from. By
comparing Speciﬁcations 1 and 4, one can infer the role of adjustments in the intensive vs. extensive
margins. Interestingly, since by using only the products available pre-GCR one is by construction not
allowing any kind of selection into treatment, the results in Speciﬁcation 4 provide a lower bound to
the eﬀects of the GCR, ie. an estimate of the intensive margin of the GCR eﬀects. Qualitatively, these
eﬀects are similar and one cannot reject the null of equality of eﬀects at the 5 percent signiﬁcance
level, but at 16.75 gCO2/km  or -4.04 mpg  the estimates based only on the products available
pre-GCR are (not surprisingly) somewhat milder than those in Speciﬁcation 1. In fact, back-of the-
envelope calculations based on the point estimates of Speciﬁcations 1 and 4 suggest that the bulk
of the adjustment in product lines  roughly 70 percent  is due to adjustments in the intensive
margin (adjustment of characteristics of, say, an AFV already available pre-GCR) rather than in the
extensive margin (introduction of new products, ie. model-fuel combinations, in particular in the
AFV segment). This evidence is consistent with the view that there is limited scope to think about
contamination of the treatment group due to self-selection into treatment, ie. endogeneity of the
AFV dummy.
Finally, sub-samples of Gasoline and FFVs (Speciﬁcation 5) and Gasoline, CNG and Electric
vehicles (Speciﬁcation 6) yield estimates in the spirit of those for the supply-side, namely implying
that the bulk of post-GCR changes do happen in the FFV segment. In particular, point estimates for
Speciﬁcation 5 are about 95 percent of those obtained for the full sample as compared to 75 percent
when looking at the supply-side, which suggests that consumers played an active part in ﬂocking
towards (high-emission) FFVs, as already apparent when from Figure 2.
Given the few months carmakers had to react to the policy via their 2008 product lines and
the longer period to do so via their 2009 ones, it is natural to consider those two eﬀects separately,
14
and this is precisely what Speciﬁcations 1-6 in Panel B do (each speciﬁcation in Panel B is directly
comparable to its Panel A counterpart). Overall, the results show that the eﬀects of the GCR on
CO2 emissions and fuel economy are insigniﬁcant in the short-run and strengthen over time when it
comes to the long-run: these may or may not be signiﬁcant for 2008, but are signiﬁcant throughout
for 2009, eg. 32.44 gCO2/km (-7.88 mpg) as per Speciﬁcation 1. As before, the results are robust to
the inclusion of controls and alternative deﬁnitions of treatment and control groups.
The long-run responses are very much in line with what one would expect. That is, given the
extended period carmakers had to think things through and re-engineer their vehicles, and consumers
had to understand the GCR's features, results in DD point estimates are larger for 2009 than 2008.
More speciﬁcally, while 2008 estimates may or may not be signiﬁcant, all of the 2009 DD estimates are
statistically signiﬁcant. As before, conﬁning the analysis to those models available pre-GCR results
in somewhat lower point estimates, but the qualitative results are unchanged. In particular, the
evidence suggests that consumers were only too keen to purchase high-emission AFVs made available
by carmakers via adjustment of their product lines in the intensive or extensive margins. In sum, this
ﬁndings suggest agents working against the very objectives of the GCR.
6.3 Discussion
The above results beg the question of where precisely the variation in the data identifying the DD
estimates is coming from, ie. the mechanism by which CO2 emissions increase in AFVs as compared
to RFVs. To ﬁx ideas, consider a car model for which both gasoline and FFV versions are available
prior to the GCR. On the supply side, given elastic demands and rebates to the order of 7 percent
for FFVs and low-emission gasoline cars, carmakers would opt for a larger version for its FFV version
as compared to the gasoline one  in the limit, an FFV version emitting more than the threshold
emissions level as compared to a gasoline version below the same threshold. (From Table A1, no FFV
emitted less than 120 gCO2/km during the sample period in the data.)
On the supply-side, the asymmetric treatment enjoyed by AFVs and RFVs leads to asymmetric
reactions by carmakers, even after controlling for fuel prices. As a result, DD estimates capturing
the causal eﬀect of the GCR on CO2 emissions of AFVs vis-à-vis RFVs are positive and signiﬁcant.
Moreover, back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that most of the reactions by carmakers were in
the intensive margins, ie. re-engineering existing models rather than introducing new variants.
Using registration data, the ﬁrst robust ﬁnding has to do with the distinction between short- and
long-run eﬀects. In the short-run, when facing product lines introduced prior to the GCR, not much
happens when comparing AFVs and RFVs. However, carmakers react to the new regulation and
adjust their product lines accordingly; while reactions may or may not be statistically insigniﬁcant
for year 2008, whose product line is introduced a few months after the GCR is put in place, it
is positive and signiﬁcant for year 2009, suggesting that the combined actions of consumers and
carmakers were detrimental to the aims of the program once choice sets were adjusted. That is, once
carmakers adjusted their product lines to the new policy, thus providing consumers with an adjusted
choice set, consumers were more likely to purchase these vehicles tinkered with typically an FFV in
detriment of a high-emission RFV. Importantly, note that the eﬀects of product introduction looking
at sales-weighted data are always larger than those obtained using supply-side data, suggesting the
importance of consumer reactions to the policy. Intuitively, this can be rationalized by the fact that
consumers have a preference for size (comfort) and engine power, even if environmental concerns
arguably have been playing an increasing role in recent times. Moreover, a signiﬁcant share of
consumers understands the option value provided by an FFV (see Section 7 for further evidence).
Finally, the very cars oﬀering this option value were available at a rebate. As a result, what
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one sees is a skew towards FFVs within models oﬀering both the gasoline and FFV options, thus
generating a response in the associated sales-weighted regressions. (See Huse and Lucinda (2013) for
a structural model of the Swedish car market and further evidence of how FFVs beneﬁted from the
asymmetric treatment dispensed to regular and alternative vehicles.)
7 Fuel Choice by FFV Motorists
The majority of vehicles running on alternative fuels in the Swedish market is made of FFVs, which
can operate on both gasoline and ethanol. Ethanol was tax-exempt at its inception, which resulted in
far lower prices when compared to those of other fuels. Although widely available throughout Sweden
only from January 2005, ethanol was already available of over half of the fueling stations by 2009.
Gasoline, diesel and CNG prices in turn are higher and more volatile than ethanol's. What's more,
the prices of these three fuels endured an upward trend from early 2007 to about mid-2008, dropping
only as a result of the global economic crisis.
The pattern of ethanol sales has grown hand-in-hand with that of FFVs for most of the period
2004-2009, see Panel A in Figure 3.22 In contrast to previous ﬁndings, e.g. Borenstein (1993), which
document that fuel switching occurs over the course of years among owners of captive cars, owners of
FFVs seem to have switched almost instantaneously to price incentives following the 2008 drop in oil
prices. This shock quickly aﬀected domestic prices and resulted in ethanol becoming more expensive
than gasoline in energy-adjusted terms already in October 2008, see Panel B in Figure 3. While
the full line in Panel B again depicts ethanol sales, the dashed one depicts the energy-adjusted price
premium of gasoline over ethanol - that is, given the lower energy content of ethanol as compared
to gasoline, prices are reported per energy unit. As soon as the gasoline price premium becomes
negative, in October 2008, ethanol sales plummet, suggesting that fuel arbitrage is substantial among
FFV owners.23 This swift reaction implies that Swedish consumers seem to account for the option
value provided by FFVs and promptly exercise it. This can be attributed to a relatively well-developed
retail network in Sweden (as opposed to what happens in the US, see also Corts 2010) where most
fuel stations supply at least one alternative fuel (second only to Brazil worldwide), typically ethanol.
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
7.1 Model
To quantify the extent to which consumers arbitrage across fuels, I propose a stylized model where
arbitrageurs and fuel-lovers coexist. The model aims at rationalizing the empirical evidence and
allows quantifying the extent of fuel-switching using only market-level data (see Salvo and Huse 2011
for a model focusing on FFV and captive ethanol owners). The main assumption has to do with
the coexistence of three consumer types, namely ethanol-lovers, gasoline-lovers and fuel arbitrageurs.
This assumes away the fact that distinct consumers have diﬀerent willingness-to-pay for fuel and can
moreover err in their fuel arbitrage calculations. It is however a pragmatic compromise to quantify
fuel switching using the aggregate data available. (Salvo and Huse 2012 provide evidence supporting
departures from perfect substitution, i.e. that a non-trivial share of motorists does not arbitrage across
22Consistent with the previous analysis and the data available, in this section I focus on light-duty vehicles able to
run on combinations of ethanol and gasoline.
23For reference, median ethanol, gasoline and energy-adjusted ethanol prices are 8.6, 12.2 and 11.6 SEK/liter,
respectively, making a drop in the price premium from roughly +2 to -2 SEK/liter substantial.
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fuels and should ideally be taken into account in such a model, whereas Anderson 2012 documents
willingness-to-pay for ethanol.)
Engine j's (average) fuel economy is given by kplj (kilometers per liter on fuel j) and in what
follows I assume away (i) variation in kilometers driven per capita and kpl across consumers; (ii)
variation in distance driven and fuel economy over time and across regions; (iii) any dynamic con-
siderations.24 This consists of a very stylized setting ignoring diﬀerences in characteristics of the
car model owned by a consumer, variations in driving patterns, time variation in the fuel, engine
technology and fuel purchases due to stockpiling and price expectations, but good enough to capture




s.t. ptransqtrans + qout ≤ y
where y is income, qtrans is the quantity of personal transportation (in kilometers) consumed by
consumer i and qout is the outside good.






Passenger car engines are endowed with the FFV technology and consumers populating the economy
are of one among three types depending on whether the FFV owner is an arbitrageur, purchases
only ethanol or only gasoline  their types is denoted by the parameter θ = (θa, θe, θg), where the
subscripts denote arbitrageurs, ethanol- and gasoline-lovers, respectively.
Each car is endowed with a single ﬂexible-fuel engine and owned by a diﬀerent consumer indexed
by i and the FFV ﬂeet at period t is of size Nt =
∑
j=a,e,g
Njt. That is, Nt consumers own FFVs at period
t and they occur in shares σ = (σa, σe, σg),
∑
j=a,e,g




time subscripts to save on notation, the demand for ethanol by consumer of type θe (ethanol-lover)
is given by
qθee (pe, y, kple) = qe(pe, y, kple|i ∈ θe) =
qtrans(pe/kple, y|i ∈ θe)
kple
and that of consumer type θa (fuel arbitrageur) is




qtrans(pg/kplg, y|i ∈ θa)
kple
]
if pe/pg = k
=
qtrans(pe/kple, y|i ∈ θa)
kple
if pe/pg < k
where pe and pg are the retail prices per liter of ethanol and gasoline, respectively and the price-per-
kilometer of personal transportation for consumer θa is given by ptrans = min {pg/kplg, pe/kple}.
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
24One kpl amounts to approximately 2.35 mpg, since 1 mile equals 1.609 km and 1 gallon equals 3.78 liters.
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The aggregate demand function for ethanol, which is depicted in Figure 4, is given by
Qe(pe, pg, y, kple, kplg, N) = Nσeq
θe










e (pe, y, kple)
]










e if pe/pg < k
consisting of (i) an interval whenever ethanol and gasoline energy-adjusted prices are equivalent; (ii)
the demand of ethanol-lovers only whenever ethanol is dearer than gasoline; and (iii) the demand of
both ethanol lovers and arbitrageurs when ethanol is cheaper than gasoline (always in energy-adjusted
terms).
Needless to say, this is a highly-stylized, short-run model. That is, it assumes away important
issues such as heterogeneity in vehicle-kilometers travelled, kilometres-per-liter, and the rebound
eﬀect, mostly due to the lack of data. Note, however, that recent research by Small and van Dender
(2007) and Hughes, Knittel and Sperling (2008) ﬁnds not only that the price elasticity of the demand
for gasoline is very inelastic, but that it has also become signiﬁcant more so in recent years.
7.2 Implementation
In an ideal setting one would want to econometrically estimate the above fuel choice model using data
on ﬂeet size and estimating fuel demand conditional on whether the price regime is pe/pg ≶ k. To
do so, one would then estimate a switching regression model accounting for price endogeneity. Here,
however, I assume a more pragmatic approach given the lack of more (disaggregate) data, and since
my interest is merely to gauge the extent of fuel switching among FFV owners.
I assume that each motorist drives χ kilometers per month and kilometerage is price-inelastic, i.e.
the rebound eﬀect is assumed away.25 This allows obtaining vehicle-kilometers traveled at month t,
vktθit for consumer type i = e, g, a. (Given that fuel lovers are typically found to be less than half of
FFV owners in the results below, assuming away the rebound eﬀect can be seen as less of a stringent
assumption.)
Fuel demand of consumer θg is given by qg|θg = vktθgt /kplg, the one of consumer θe is given
by qe|θe = vktθet /kple and that of consumer θa is qf |θa = 1{pet/pgt > k}vktθat /kplg + 1{pet/pgt <
k}vktθat /kple ,where f equals e or g if pet/pgt is less than or larger than k, i.e. arbitrageurs will
demand ethanol or gasoline depending on whether pe/pg ≶ k.
To obtain market demands for both gasoline and ethanol, let Qet and Qgt be the volume sales of,
respectively, ethanol and gasoline at month t and q˜G the volume sales of gasoline to owners of captive




25Faced with the possibility to switch between fuels, one would expect the price elasticity of fuel (gasoline and
ethanol) for FFV owners to be even more inelastic than standard estimates. In contrast, using consumer-level data,
Salvo and Huse (2012) ﬁnd that while a substantial share of Brazilian consumers (about 60 percent) tends to arbitrage
across fuels, gasoline and ethanol are not seen as perfect substitutes by many consumers. This ﬁnding is likely to be
due to the early hiccups of the ethanol technology in the 1980s  thus in stark contrast with the more advanced one





















if pet/pgt < k. That is, ethanol-lovers purchase ethanol regardless of its relative prices whereas
gasoline-lovers and owners of captive gasoline cars always purchase gasoline. However, fuel arbi-
trageurs switch between gasoline and ethanol according to price incentives.
Now assume the existence of only two sets of price vectors, E − cheap and E − dear, which are
observed at months t′ and t′′, respectively. By looking at ethanol sales only it is possible to identify
σe and σa by solving the above system and obtaining










QE−cheapet′ , 1− σe − σa
)
As a result, the share of arbitrageurs is increasing in fuel economy (kple) and demand sensitivity(
QE−cheapet′ −QE−dearet′′
)
while decreasing in kilometerage (χ).
One could also take a stand on the components of q˜G and proceed in a similar way, but given
the substantial heterogeneity in the captive gasoline car ﬂeet, i.e. the diﬀerent kilometerage and fuel
economy patterns of old and new vehicles, the assumptions made for the more homogeneous FFV
ﬂeet would require a further reality stretch which would not necessarily add value to the exercise.
To quantify the vector of consumer shares σ, I need to make assumptions on kilometerage per
month (χ), kilometers driven per liter of ethanol (kple) and obtain estimates of the ﬂeet in both high
and low regimes of ethanol prices (Nt′ and Nt′′ , respectively). By plugging in the volume sales of
ethanol in the two price regimes I then obtain a candidate σ vector.
7.3 Shares of Consumer Types
In what follows, I describe the calibration of the model deﬁning σ = (σa, σe, σg).
26 The oil price drop
in September-October 2008 caused by the global recession provides an ideal situation to do so. First,
because one would want months t′ and t′′ to be as close as possible, since driving patterns have a
pronounced seasonal component and there is bound to be measurement error in ﬂeet size data.
Second, because the oil price drop was sudden, substantial and passed through to domestic gasoline
prices, thus providing a credible source of exogenous price variation.
Third, because this variation happened when the FFV ﬂeet size was already non-negligible and
ethanol was widely distributed across the country.
The data I use are the FFV monthly ﬂeet data from the Swedish Transportation Authority and
ethanol monthly volume sales from the Swedish Petroleum Institute (SPI). I set QE−cheapet′′ to be
the volume of ethanol sold in September 2008, just before the recession started. As for QE−dearet′ , I
consider both November 2008 ethanol sales. Given the seasonal pattern in fuel demand, calculations
were performed after deseasonalizing ethanol sales using month ﬁxed-eﬀects. (For instance, recall
26Recently, Holland, Hughes and Knittel (2009) have adopted a similar strategy, numerically simulating a LCFS (low
carbon fuel standard) on gasoline and ethanol using parameters based on the US market.
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that although the diﬀerence is minimal, gasoline is less likely to freeze than ethanol, since the latter
contains some water. As a result, one can think of motorists being less likely to purchase ethanol as
temperatures decrease.)
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
The results are reported in Table 4 (see the Appendix for robustness checks). I take a stand on
the following variables. First, I assume FFVs drive χ = 1500,1750 or 2000 km/month, depending on
the scenario (corresponding to 11250-14900 miles per year). According to the Swedish Transportation
Authority, the average Swedish car running on gasoline drives about 15,000 km/year, with new cars
driving substantially more. Second, I set kple = 8, using kple = 6, 7, 10 for sensitivity analysis (thus
considering fuel economy in the range 19.1-31.8 mpg of gasoline).27
Panel A in Table 4 reports the key parameters in the exercise discussed above whereas Panel
B report the shares of consumer types corresponding to each of the six scenarios considered. With
a median value of 15.4 percent, the share of ethanol-lovers is not too sensitive to changes in the
parameter values: it varies in the range 10.8-18 percent, where the lowest value is obtained for Scenario
4, which has the lowest fuel economy and highest kilometerage among all scenarios considered. With
a median value of 19 percent, the share of gasoline-lovers is more sensitive to parameter values,
varying in the range 5.5-43.3 percent, and increasing at the expense of ethanol-lovers. Finally, the
median share of fuel arbitrageurs is 66.3 percent, with values in the range 45.9-76.5 percent. Despite
the sensitivity to parameter values, the robust ﬁnding of the exercise is that most FFV owners
are fuel arbitrageurs, following closely the developments in fuel prices and purchasing the cheapest
one, whereas ethanol-lovers, or environmentally-friendly drivers, represent only a small share of FFV
owners in Sweden.
7.4 Implications for Air Pollution
Lifecycle vs. Tailpipe CO2 Emissions The carbon footprint of an automobile can be reported
in two ways. The ﬁrst, which is based on tailpipe (exhaust) emissions follows the EU methodology and
is consistent with Sweden's oﬃcial report to the EU (see EU Directive 80/1268/EEC for details on
the testing routine). While this method is appropriate to gauge the eﬀect of improved fuel eﬃciency
in vehicles, it does not take into account the climate beneﬁts of a large proportion of new cars that
can also run on ethanol. That is, an alternative way to account for the carbon footprint of a vehicle
is to use emissions adjusted for the life-cycle climate beneﬁts of ethanol. The second method of
assessing the carbon footprint of a vehicle thus provides a life-cycle perspective of both fossil and
renewable fuels, with gasoline and diesel emissions being some 12 percent and 13 percent higher
than exhaust pipe emissions, respectively. In other words, a given engine emits less if running on
ethanol or gas than gasoline, so one needs to apply a discount factor on gasoline emissions if a FFV is
running on ethanol. According to Swedish Consumer Agency (2011), CO2 emissions from the use of
ethanol are approximately 55 percent lower than those of gasoline, supporting the view that whenever
one switches from ethanol to gasoline, the impact in terms of CO2 emissions can be non-trivial and
ultimately jeopardizes the aims of the Swedish policy.
The Eﬀect of Fuel Switching on Air Pollution Besides emitting GHG, of which CO2 and
Methane are the best known, combustion engines also emit local air pollutants. By switching from
27Although these values are arguably on the lower-side of kpl, one has to account for the fact that, given the lower
energy content of ethanol as compared to gasoline, kple is roughly 30 percent lower than kplg and actual fuel economy
is in practice lower than lab measurements provided by carmakers under ideal testing conditions.
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ethanol to gasoline, motorists are (unknowingly) increasing the emissions of some pollutants while
decreasing the emission of others. The related literature still seems to be in its early days, with
Jacobson (2007) reporting that ethanol is superior to gasoline in terms of CO2 emissions but not
local pollutants and Yanowitz and McCormick (2009) providing a compilation of comparative exhaust
emissions of gasoline and ethanol using FFVs.
Panel C in Table 4 reports how the switch from ethanol to gasoline by FFV owners impacts the
concentration of a number of air pollutants. To construct Panel C, I combine results in Panel B with
life-cycle CO2 emissions reported by the Swedish Consumer Agency (2011) and those in Yanowitz
and McCormick (2009), which are used by the US EPA (only air pollutants for which the diﬀerence
in emissions between gasoline and ethanol is statistically signiﬁcant are included).
Among the eight pollutants considered in Panel C, switching from ethanol to gasoline decreases the
concentration of four  namely 1,3-Butadiene, Carbon Monoxide (CO), Formaldehyde and Methane 
while increasing the concentration of the remaining four  CO2, Nonmethane Hydrocarbon, NOx and
Particulate Matter (PM). Interestingly, the changes are somewhat similar across scenarios for most of
the pollutants. Consider for instance the changes in the concentrations of PM, NOx and CO, which
are classiﬁed as criteria pollutants by the US EPA that is, pollutants for which national standards
are set: while the reduction in CO is in the range 16.8-18 percent, the increases in NOx and PM are
in the range 20-21.7 and 42.1-50.1 percent, respectively. The pollutant for which the estimates vary
most across scenarios is CO2, the main GHG, with increases in the range 79.9-114.5 percent. Given
the focus of policymakers on CO2 emissions, fuel switching by FFV owners from ethanol to gasoline
paints an overall gloomy picture when it comes to air pollution.28
Discussion Stepping back, the results reported in Table 4 suggest a low share of ethanol-lovers,
likely to base fuel choice on environmental concerns. A more substantial share of consumers corre-
sponds to gasoline-lovers: these are consumers who potentially received the rebate upon the purchase
of a FFV and never use the renewable fuel. Finally, most FFV owners are actively using the option
value of their FFV and arbitraging across fuels after pocketing the value of the rebate. Although
pollution levels may increase or decrease following the switch according to the pollutant considered,
the eﬀect on CO2 emissions is clear and points to a substantial increase in its levels.
Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the eﬀects of the Swedish GCR, an environmental policy which had an unprece-
dented impact on the automobile market and embraced alternative fuels and vehicles. Speciﬁcally, it
disentangles the reactions of consumers and carmakers to the program by comparing CO2 emissions
and fuel economy levels of alternative and regular fuel vehicles.
Had the aim of the policy been merely to increase the adoption of green cars, it would have
been considered a success, since it raised market shares of this segment from 6 percent in 2006 to
28The above analysis is essentially short-term. Another question worth addressing is the one on the eﬀect of fuel
choice on air pollution over the lifetime of an automobile. Performing this long-run exercise would rely on careful
modeling of fuel prices and require assumptions on the stability of shares of consumer types over time. While a
reduced-form model of fuel prices (or their corresponding ﬁrst-diﬀerences or return series) has a reasonable degree of
explanatory power (the R-squared of univariate models is in the range 40-60 percent), the link between car and fuel
markets tends to strengthen as the market share of FFVs increases (see Salvo and Huse 2011, who document such a
ﬁnding for the Brazilian market, when FFVs commanded about 35 percent of the car ﬂeet). A further complicating
factor in the case of sugarcane ethanol, the leading variety used in Sweden, is the relation between the sugar and
ethanol markets, see Salvo and Huse 2011 for a joint treatment). As a result, such a long-run analysis  ideally based
on a structural model as in, e.g. Bento et al (2009)  is left for future research.
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26.5 percent in 2008. However, the paper documents that one by-product of the GCR is that CO2
emission levels of AFVs beneﬁting from the program increased in a non-trivial way with respect to
those able to run on regular (fossil, i.e. diesel and gasoline) fuels. This so happens because of the
asymmetric treatment dispensed to alternative and regular fuel vehicles, whereby the latter received
a much stricter treatment than the former to qualify as a green car and be eligible for the $1,500
rebate. Speciﬁcally, it induced carmakers to adjust their product lines to this regulatory loophole,
which resulted in higher emission AFVs vis-à-vis their regular counterparts. What is more, since
most FFV owners do arbitrage across fuels and purchase the cheapest between gasoline and ethanol,
this is likely to result in increased air pollution levels.
Empirically, I unveil the role of technology and identify the mechanism by which consumers
and carmakers react to loophole created by the GCR. On the supply-side, the wedge between CO2
emissions (fuel economy) of AFVs and those of RFVs increased in a non-trivial way following the
GCR, especially in model-year 2009.
Looking at registration data, I ﬁnd evidence of an insigniﬁcant eﬀect in the months right after
the GCR's inception  that is, April-December 2007  whereby consumers, which were constrained
to purchase products that had been on the market prior to the program, did not seem to react to
AFVs any diﬀerently to RFVs. However, following the introduction of the 2008 and especially 2009
product lines, consumers facing an adjusted choice set were more likely to purchase high-emission
AFVs. Importantly, the results point to the predominant role of the intensive (re-engineered versions
of products existing prior to the GCR) over the extensive margin (product introduction).
The paper also proposes a stylized structural model of fuel choice for owners of FFVs, the leading
alternative technology in the Swedish market and a key technology in the dissemination of renewable
fuels worldwide. A major share of FFV owners promptly switched from ethanol to gasoline following
the 2008 drop in oil prices, which resulted in the plummeting of ethanol sales in the country  when
bringing the model to data, I ﬁnd that the majority of FFV owners are fuel arbitrageurs. As a result,
despite investments in fueling infrastructure to increase the retail presence of renewables (notably
ethanol) and the rebate paid upon the purchase of a green car, fuel switching induced an increase of
at least 80 percent in life-cycle CO2 emissions from the part of FFV owners. In short, policymakers
have been held hostages of the FFV technology thanks to the way regulation was designed.
The above ﬁndings  which provide insights for most alternatives to fossil fuels, not only ethanol
 have a number of policy implications. First, since ﬂexible-fuel technologies essentially piggy-back
on existing ones (in this case the Otto cycle engine), they can be used to disseminate the adoption
of renewable fuels in general. Moreover, since ﬂexible-fuel technologies do not lock-in consumers to
a speciﬁc fuel, policymakers can impose common thresholds to regular and alternative fuel vehicles:
consumers should  and the evidence provided above suggests that they actively do  switch to FFVs
also due to the option value provided by this very technology, i.e. arbitraging across fuels.
Second, although the embracing of renewable fuels will be larger the more developed their re-
tail network, such network is only a necessary condition for the dissemination of renewables, since
arbitrageurs make up a non-trivial share of FFV owners.
Third, as a signiﬁcant number of FFVs hits the road, policymakers can induce motorists to switch
to renewable fuels by subsidizing renewables and/or taxing fossil fuels more heavily.
All in all, by highlighting how both carmakers and consumers reacted to the policy in ways that
worked against its very objectives, the paper stresses the challenge of policy design in the transport
sector. A good policy has to take into account the technologies being regulated and the diﬀerent
adjustment margins (intensive, extensive, fuel switching) involved. A fuel tax (or an increase thereof)
should be able to provide right incentives in all these margins, but is unlikely to be politically
sustainable in a number of countries, notably the US.
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For both the supply-side and sales-weighted analysis, while the results are reported using for real fuel
prices, I have also experimented with nominal prices, obtaining similar results in terms of signiﬁcance.
I have also replaced ethanol prices with the lowest between energy-adjusted ethanol and gasoline
prices, which are then interacted with the dummies for FFVs to be used as proxies for the operating
costs of an FFV: I obtain estimates with similar magnitudes and statistical signiﬁcances than the
reported ones. I have also re-estimated the DD regressions using a number of subsamples obtaining
similar results.
Supply-side Analysis I have also estimated versions of the reported speciﬁcations using 12-month
moving-averages of fuel prices ending in December prior to the launch of a product line, e.g. fuel prices
from January to December 2006 for the 2008 product line, the results are robust to changes in the
rolling window as well as 12-month moving averages computed until the March, June or September
prior to the launch of a product line, e.g. fuel prices from October 2006 to September 2007 for the
2008 product line. The adoption of long moving averages helps wash out seasonal eﬀects likely to
appear in time series of fuel prices (and in driving patterns). I have moreover considered alternative
treatment and control groups, eg. comparing FFVs to high-emission gasoline vehicles only (instead
of all gasoline vehicles), with results similar to the reported ones.
Sales-weighted Analysis Besides the robustness checks noted above I have also estimated sales-
weighted speciﬁcations using data at the annual frequency and considered lagged fuel prices, again
with similar results.
A.2 Calibration of Fuel Choice Model
To the possible extent, the key parameters in the exercise were chosen so as to provide a meaningful
range of parameter values. An important constraint is the adding-up condition requiring consumer
shares to sum to one, which binds in some cases. Controlling for seasonality in fuel demand results
in more conservative results for the share of fuel arbitrageurs  a previous version of this paper not
doing so obtained results which were qualitatively similar but with a higher share of fuel arbitrageurs.
B Descriptive Statistics
Table A1 provides summary statistics disaggregated by the fuel segment level. When looking at the
market as a whole, both average and median CO2 emission levels seem to decrease during the 2004-
2009 period. For instance, by inspecting the quartiles of the overall distribution of CO2 emissions,
there seems to be a reduction of about 20 gCO2/km throughout the sample period.
TABLE A1 ABOUT HERE
The ﬁgures for the diesel segment are in line with ﬁndings in Sallee and Slemrod (2011) for the
US and Canadian markets as well as evidence provided by the EFTE (2009), which supports the view
that advances in the diesel technology resulted in a substantial decrease in CO2 emissions while ﬁxing
or increasing the horsepower of a given engine within a two-year period.29 However, the descriptive
29EFTE (2009) documents decreases in CO2 emissions in the range 17-27 percent for a sample of models while either
ﬁxing or increasing their engine horsepower.
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evidence in Table A1 and exploratory analysis performed does not lend support to the view that
carmakers introduced models whose CO2 emission bunched at the 120 gCO2/km threshold. In fact,
the ﬁgures for low-emission gasoline and diesel vehicles do not seem to change by much from 2006
(or earlier, in the case of gasoline) to 2009.
Although not representing a major share of the market, notice that average CO2 emissions of
Gasoline/CNG and Gasoline/Electric (both of which are AFVs) actually increased following the
GCR. Although this ﬁnding also holds for FFVs, the most striking feature, however, seems to be the
fact that no low-emission FFV was introduced at any time during the sample period, despite the
introduction of a number of low-emission captive gasoline vehicles, which share their technology with
FFVs.
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TABLE 1  Summary Statistics of the Swedish Car Market
Sweden France Germany
Fleet Size and Penetration
Passenger car ﬂeet, millions (2008) 4.3 30.9 41.3
Passenger cars per 100 inhabitants (2008) 46.3 49.5 50.4
Share of households with a vehicle (%, 2006) 84.5 82 NA
Average Vehicle Characteristics
Average car age, years (2008) 9.5 8.3 8.2
Average engine of new cars, in cc (2007) 1,964 1,680 1,863
Average power of new cars, in kw (2007) 105 80 96
Share of passenger cars able to run on fuels
other than gasoline and diesel (%, 2008) 3.8 0 0.9
Age Distribution of Car Fleet
Share of cars ≤ 5 years (%, 2008) 29.0 33.4 34.3
Share of cars 5-10 years (%, 2008) 31.9 33.0 33.0
Share of cars > 10 years (%, 2008) 39.1 33.6 33.6
Note: This table is constructed using data from ANFAC (2010). Engine sizes are reported in
cubic centimeters (cc).
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TABLE 2  Supply-side Results
Panel A: Post-GCR DD Estimates
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Fuels: All All All FFV,G G,CNG,El
1{y ≥ 2008} × 1{i ∈ ℵ} 21.48∗∗∗ 28.47∗∗∗ 27.78∗∗∗ 16.23∗∗ -0.22
(5.00) (2.92) (2.74) (2.23) (-0.02)






N 9, 686 8, 110 8, 110 6, 594 6, 498
R-squared .012 .143 .147 .007 .011
Panel B: Post-GCR DD Estimates Disaggregated for Years 2008 and 2009
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Fuels: All All All FFV,G G,CNG,El
1{y = 2008} × 1{i ∈ ℵ} 16.66∗∗∗ 34.14 33.91 12.50∗∗ -8.03
(2.75) (1.43) (1.50) (2.11) (−0.51)
[-3.25]∗∗∗ [−11.40] [-11.13] [-2.03]∗∗ [2.06]
1{y = 2009} × 1{i ∈ ℵ} 25.86∗∗∗ 28.77∗∗∗ 26.43∗∗∗ 19.85∗∗ 5.76
(5.56) (3.07) (2.80) (2.25) (0.42)






N 9, 686 8, 110 8, 110 6, 594 6, 498
R-squared .014 .143 .147 .008 .012
Note: This table reports estimates of the eﬀect of the GCR on engine CO2 emissions (measured in
gCO2/km) and mpg (point estimates reported within square brackets) of AFVs as compared to RFVs
using supply-side data recorded at the yearly frequency. For each panel, Column 1 reports results
for the full sample (all fuels, 2005-2009) without any controls. Columns 2 and 3 introduce Fuel-year
ﬁxed-eﬀects to account for fuel price trends, determinants of oﬀering an AFV, and their interaction
with a GCR dummy. Columns 4-5 are counterpart of Column 1: while Column 4 considers only FFV
and Gasoline vehicles, Column 5 considers only Gasoline, CNG and Electric vehicles. Standard errors
are clustered by brand, with t-statistics reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels at 10, 5 and 1
percent are denoted by *,** and ***, respectively. R-squareds of mpg regressions are .014, .277, .282,
.007, .019 (Panel A) and .016, .277, .282, .009, .021 (Panel B).
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TABLE 3  Registration-based Emission Levels
Panel A: Post-GCR DD Estimates
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Fuels: All All All pre-GCR FFV,G G,CNG,El
1{t ∈ ΓSR} × 1{i ∈ ℵ} 2.65 -7.30 -7.31 2.17 1.88 -10.70
(0.41) (-0.72) (-0.76) (0.48) (0.26) (-0.62)
[1.48] [0.93] [0.89] [−1.31] [−1.11] [2.58]
1{t ∈ ΓLR} × 1{i ∈ ℵ} 24.60∗∗∗ 22.35∗∗∗ 19.22∗∗∗ 16.75∗∗∗ 23.46∗∗∗ 1.555
(5.23) (4.03) (2.86) (3.67) (4.08) (0.11)






N 588285 522779 522779 499296 469282 421456
R-squared .055 .151 .164 .034 .048 .062
Panel B: Post-GCR DD Estimates Disaggregated for Years 2008 and 2009
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Fuels: All All All pre-GCR FFV,G G,CNG,El
1{t ∈ ΓSR} × 1{i ∈ ℵ} 2.65 −7.29 −7.30 2.17 1.88 −10.70
(0.41) (−0.72) (−0.76) (0.48) (0.26) (−0.62)
[−1.48] [0.93] [0.89] [−1.31] [−1.11] [2.58]
1{t ∈ ΓLR1} × 1{i ∈ ℵ} 21.12∗∗∗ 16.07∗ 12.48 13.36∗∗ 20.06∗∗∗ −2.84
(6.20) (1.88) (1.20) (2.29) (4.46) (−0.20)
[−5.28]∗∗∗ [−3.32]∗∗ [−2.24] [−3.19]∗∗ [−4.29]∗∗∗ [2.14]
1{t ∈ ΓLR2}.1{i ∈ ℵ} 32.44∗∗∗ 32.86∗∗∗ 30.44∗∗∗ 25.60∗∗∗ 31.67∗∗∗ 17.96
(3.67) (3.84) (3.46) (5.25) (3.14) (1.40)






N 588285 522779 522779 499296 469282 421456
R-squared .057 .153 .166 .036 .050 .064
Note: This table reports estimates of the eﬀect of the GCR on engine CO2 emissions (measured
in gCO2/km) and mpg (reported within square brackets) of AFVs as compared to RFVs using reg-
istration recorded at the monthly frequency. For each panel, Column 1 reports results for the full
sample (all fuels, 2005-2009) without any controls. Columns 2 and 3 introduce Fuel-time ﬁxed-eﬀects
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to account for fuel price trends, determinants of oﬀering an AFV, and their interaction with a GCR
dummy. Columns 4-6 are counterparts of Column 1: Column 4 considers only models available pre-
GCR (ie. model-fuel combinations launched up to model-year 2006), Column 5 considers only FFV
and Gasoline vehicles whereas Column 6 considers only Gasoline, CNG and Electric vehicles. Note
that the eﬀects of Speciﬁcation 4 or Speciﬁcation 5 in each Panel are contained within the 95 percent
conﬁdence interval of the corresponding Speciﬁcation 1. Standard errors are clustered by brand, with
t-statistics reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels at 10, 5 and 1 percent are denoted by *,** and
***, respectively. R-squareds of mpg regressions are .087, .289, .307, .053, .070, .096 (Panel A) and
.089, .291, .309, .056, .073, .099 (Panel B).
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TABLE 4  Consumer Types in Fuel Choice and Change in Air Pollution due to FFV Owners'
Switch from Ethanol to Gasoline
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Panel A: Scenario Parameters
kpl (running on ethanol) 6 7 8 6 8 10
χ (km per month) 1,500 1,500 1,750 2,000 2,000 2,000
Panel B: Shares of each consumer type (%)
σe (ethanol lovers) 14.4 16.8 16.4 10.8 14.4 18.0
σa (arbitrageurs) 61.2 71.4 70.0 45.9 61.2 76.5
σg (gasoline lovers) 24.4 11.8 13.6 43.3 24.4 5.5
Panel C: Change in air pollutant concentrations (%)
CO2 94.1 106.8 104.8 79.9 94.1 114.5
Nonmethane Hydrocarbon 13.2 13.4 13.4 12.9 13.2 13.5
1,3-Butadiene -42.2 -40.1 -40.4 -45.9 -42.2 -39.1
NOx 20.8 21.4 21.3 20.0 20.8 21.7
Particulate Matter 45.8 48.6 48.1 42.1 45.8 50.1
CO -17.4 -17.0 -17.1 -18.0 -17.4 -16.8
Formaldehyde -42.7 -40.5 -40.8 -46.4 -42.7 -39.5
Methane -54.3 -50.8 -51.3 -60.5 -54.3 -49.2
Note: This table examines the fuel switching behavior of FFV owners following the 2008 oil
price drop and its eﬀects on air pollution. All calculations are based on September and November
2008 (corresponding to cheap and dear ethanol months, respectively). Panel A reports the basic
assumptions regarding kilometerage (in km/month) and fuel economy (in kilometers/liter, running
on ethanol). Kilometerage assumptions used are in the range 11250-14900 miles per year and fuel
economy is in the range 19.1-31.8 mpg running on gasoline. Panel B reports the shares of consumer
types for each scenario. Panel C reports the percentage change in the concentration of air pollutants
for which the equality for ethanol and gasoline is rejected according to Yanowitz and McCormick
(2009).
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2004m1 2006m1 2008m1 2010m1
Month
GCR starts GCR ends
RFVs >120gCO2/km RFVs <=120gCO2/km
AFVs: FFVs AFVs: Gasoline/Electric
AFVs: Gasoline/CNG
Note: RFVs: Regular Fuel Vehicles; AFVs: Alternative Fuel Vehicles; FFVs: (Gasoline/Ethanol) Flexible−fuel Vehicles
Market Shares : Regular vs. Alternative Fuel Vehicles
Note: This ﬁgure depicts market shares of passenger cars sold to private individuals in the Swedish
car market at the monthly frequency disaggregated by fuel segment with the vertical bars denoting
the start (April 2007) and the end (June 2009) of the GCR. Vehicles running on regular fuels are
split into two groups, namely high- and low-emission regular vehicles, depending on whether they
emit more or less than 120 gCO2/km. Vehicles able to run on alternative fuels (AFVs) are split
into FFVs (gasoline/ethanol), gasoline/CNG and gasoline/electric. The ﬁgure shows the decrease in
the market shares of high-emission regular vehicles and the increase in those of low-emission regular
vehicles and FFVs, the leading AFV, while showing that the market shares of gasoline/CNG and
gasoline/electric vehicles were essentially ﬂat during the GCR period. The ﬁgure also suggests the
existence of anticipatory eﬀects at the (publicly announced) end of the GCR in June 2009, but no
compelling evidence thereof at its start in April 2007.
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FIGURE 2  CO2 Emissions of Regular and Alternative Fuel Vehicles





















2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
RFVs AFVs
Note: RFVs: Regular Fuel Vehicles; AFVs: Alternative Fuel Vehicles
Supply − side Emissions : Regular vs. Alt. Fuel Vehicles



















2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
RFVs AFVs
Note: RFVs: Regular Fuel Vehicles; AFVs: Alternative Fuel Vehicles
Sales − weighted Emissions : Regular vs. Alt. Fuel Vehicles
Note: This ﬁgure compares supply-side (Panel A) and sales-weighted (Panel B) CO2 emissions mea-
sured in gCO2/km of cars running on regular and alternative fuels at the yearly frequency. The ﬁrst
vertical bar in each graph divides the sample into a pre- and post-GCR periods (years 2005-6 and
2007-9, respectively) whereas the second vertical bar divides the post-GCR period into a short-run
eﬀect (2007) where carmakers were not able to re-enginer their vehicles and a long-run eﬀect (2008-9)
where carmakers were able to adjust their product lines accordingly. The ﬁgure suggests the exis-
tence of common trends pre-GCR, not rejected in the data in either case and, following the GCR, an
increasing trend in average CO2 emissions of AFVs as compared to a still decreasing trend for RFVs.
While Panel A documents a purely supply-side eﬀect, since all models marketed in a given year are
given equal weight, Panel B shows a composition efect between supply and demand, thus having an
equilibrium interpretation.
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FIGURE 3  Development of Ethanol Sales, FFV Fleet and Gasoline Price Premium in the
Swedish Market
































































FFV fleet Ethanol Sales
Ethanol Sales and FFV Fleet



































































Gasoline Price Premium Ethanol Sales
Ethanol Sales and Gasoline Price Premium
Note: This ﬁgure depicts variables related to the FFV market segment. Panel A depicts ethanol
sales and the number of FFVs registered in the Swedish market. While the sales ethanol grew hand
in hand with the sales of FFVs for the earlier part of the series, the drop in oil prices in fall 2008
and associated drop in gasoline prices resulted in a drop in the sales of ethanol of roughly 70 percent,
due to the fuel switching behavior of a substantial share of FFV owners. Panel B depicts ethanol
sales and the energy-adjusted price premium of gasoline over ethanol, calculated to reﬂect the energy
content of each fuel. The price of gasoline peaks in mid-2008 dropping right afterwards due to the
start of the global economic crisis. The price increase of ethanol in late 2008 is essentially seasonal,
associated to the sugarcane crop in Brazil and India.
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FIGURE 4  Market Demand for Ethanol
Note: This ﬁgure depicts the market demand for ethanol as a function of the ethanol-gasoline price
ratio. Consumer type θj (j=a,e,g) appears as a share σj of the population. While only ethanol-lovers
θe demand ethanol when it is priced above the parity level (pe/pg>k), both ethanol-lovers and fuel
arbitrageurs θa demand it when ethanol is priced below the parity level (pe/pg<k).
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TABLE A1 – Supply-side Summary Statistics 
 
 CO2 Emissions (gCO2/km) 
Fuel    2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total  mean 210.8 210.4 205.6 199.5 198.8 191.3 
                  se(mean) 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.2 
                  median 205 205 197 186 188 181 
                  IQ range 175-239 172-239 167-234 159-226 161-225 155-216.5 
Total ≤ 120g mean 107.1 106.8 113.6 114.4 113.7 114.1 
 
se(mean) 3.1 2.9 0.9 1.1 0.9 0.7 
 
median 114.5 113 116 118 116 118 
 IQ range 90-118 90-116 109-119 109-119 109-119 109-119 
Gasoline mean 218.0 218.3 215.4 213.0 212.4 206.0 
                  se(mean) 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.9 1.7 1.7 
                  median 213 211 207 197 199 193 
                  IQ range 184-246 182-249 180-244 170-242 173-238 167-232 
Gasoline ≤ 120g mean 116.3 115.3 112.1 111.1 112.1 113.1 
 
se(mean) 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 
 
median 116 116 111 109 109 112 
 IQ range 113-119 113-116 109-116 109-113 109-116 109-119 
Diesel  mean 188.8 188.1 183.0 172.2 174.8 168.3 
                  se(mean) 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.3 
                  median 185.5 187 174 162 169 160 
                  IQ range 153-215 153-216 154-210 145-189 148-193 146-184 
Diesel ≤ 120g mean 97.1 101.3 114.8 115.8 114.6 115.2 
 
se(mean) 5.2 4.5 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.0 
 
median 90 100 118 119 119 119 
 IQ range 90-116 90-116 115-119 116-119 114.5-119 112-119 
FFV Mean 165.0 185.3 185.4 184.4 194.2 195.1 
                  se(mean) 0.0 6.8 6.8 4.6 3.7 3.1 
                  median 165 172 172 175.5 184.5 191.5 
                  IQ range 165-165 169-179 169-179 169-206 174-213 177-214 
FFV ≤ 120g No models available 
Gasoline/CNG Mean 199.5 198.0 164.4 150.4 147.6 156.9 
                  se(mean) 12.4 12.2 7.9 6.3 9.7 4.5 
                  median 213 215 164 157 155 157 
                  IQ range 150-231 150-228 148-183 136.5-164 138-160 144-167 
Gasoline/Electric Mean 104.0 104.0 147.8 147.8 161.8 171.3 
                  se(mean) . . 23.9 23.9 23.3 21.3 
                  median 104 104 147.5 147.5 185 188.5 
                  IQ range 104-104 104-104 106.5-189 106.5-189 109-192 109-219 
 
Note: This table reports sample statistics of the distribution of engine CO2 emissions (measured in gCO2/km) disaggregated by fuel segment. For a given 
year, a model is a combination of brand-model-fuel. Sample statistics reported are mean emission levels and their standard errors, median emission levels 
and the interquartile range of emissions. 
 
